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Abstract 
 
Scholars often study isolated media effects in single country using one method at one 
moment in time. We seek to generalize the research in this area by examining hundreds of 
press-worthy events across dozens of countries at various points in time with an array of 
techniques and outcome measures. In particular, we merge a database containing thousands 
of national events with five waves of the European Social Survey to conduct analyses 
across countries and individuals as well as within countries and subjects. The results 
suggest that there is an impressive degree of heterogeneity when it comes to how citizens 
react to political developments. In particular, some events generate significant opinion 
changes when groups of individuals who are “treated” are compared to “control” cases. 
However, other events produce modest or even null findings with methods that employ 
different counterfactuals. Thus, findings of both strong and weak media effects that 
scholars have uncovered over the years could be a function of methodological choices as 
well as context-specific factors such as institutional arrangements, media-systems, eras, or 
event characteristics. Data limitations also make some research designs possible while they 
preclude others. We conclude with advice for others who wish to study political events in 
this manner as well as discussion of media effects, broadly construed. 
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Numerous media effects studies exist. Some employ statistical analyses of cross-sectional 
datasets to arrive at their conclusions (e.g., Dalton, Beck, and Huckfeldt 1998; Druckman and 
Parkin 2005; Kahn and Kenney 2002). Others use panel studies (Ladd and Lenz 2009; Patterson 
and McClure1976) or coverage variations in natural settings (Lassen 2005; Prior 2007; Finserass 
and Listhaug 2013). Experimental approaches are also growing in popularity (Iyengar, Peters, 
and Kinder 1982; Berinsky and Kinder 2006; Neuman, Just, and Crigler 1992). Yet another class 
of studies employs hybrid designs, such as comparing individuals to themselves within a given 
survey as if they were panelists (Barabas and Jerit 2009) or comparisons of survey experiments 
to actual media events in the natural world (Barabas and Jerit 2010). On top of all of this, the 
domains of inquiry vary too—both geographically and temporarily—with some focusing on one 
country over time (e.g., Soroka 2006; Kellstedt 2000; Stevens and Banducci 2013) and others 
comparing across countries (e.g., Soroka et al. 2012; Fraile 2013; Iyengar et al 2010; 2009).  
Given the methodological heterogeneity underlying the study of media effects, perhaps it 
is not surprising that the findings are also quite mixed. There has been an evolution over the 
years from minimal effects (Klapper 1960; McGuire 1986) to massive effects (Bartels 1993; 
Zaller 1996). Yet, some wonder whether a new era of minimal effects may be upon us (Bennett 
and Iyengar 2008). Complicating matters further, it could also be that media effects exist but that 
most surveys lack features needed to reveal the effects. For instance, media effects might be hard 
to detect without sufficiently detailed measures of exposure (e.g., Barabas and Jerit 2010; 
Dilliplane, Goldman, and Mutz 2013; Druckman and Parkin 2005), but some critics believe 
media exposure measures are deeply flawed (Prior 2009) while others argue that exposure 
analyses may prove to be futile because many media studies lack statistical power (Zaller 2002).  
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In this paper, we adopt a broad view of media effects research in an attempt to pit various 
designs against each other using various types of data in a diverse set of countries over many 
years. While we identified some noteworthy patterns, on balance we find that casting a wide net 
tends to yield very little in the way of statistically significant media effects. However, the lack of 
significance stems most notably from data issues related to the number of observations, the 
timing of the inquiry, and (most importantly) the design choices that lead to alternative 
counterfactuals. In the end, some subtle but important ways in which media effects data are 
collected and analyzed may help scholars better document their existence. 
 
Media Effects Heterogeneity due to Designs, Data, and Context 
 
In an ideal world, at least from the vantage point of a media effects researcher, news 
stories of varying levels of importance and on various topics would be randomly assigned to a 
diverse set of citizens. In such a world, we would also see randomly distributed variation across 
types of media outlets, types of stories, and temporal eras. To complete the vision of this 
scholarly utopia, data to evaluate the effects would be plentiful and of high quality.  
Unfortunately, the real world departs from this ideal in several ways. Decisions about 
what appears in the news are often left to journalist and their employers (Dunaway 2008), 
although sometimes everyday people have input as “citizen journalists” in some public 
journalism schools of thought (Rosen 2001). It is also the case that data availability constrains 
analytical latitude—with inadequate measures of individual-level characteristics as well as the 
information environment they inhabit. That is, studies frequently lack variables thought to be 
important in media effects research such as media exposure (e.g., Jerit, Barabas, and Bolsen 
2006) or they study media effects without including information on the nature of the media-
inspiring event.   
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Perhaps for these reasons, single-country analyses abound. They are helpful because they 
allow analysts to go into depth when it comes to what they can say about the effects of any 
particular event. For example, Zaller and Hunt (1995) studied Ross Perot’s paranoia during the 
1992 campaign. Lenz and Ladd (2009) focus on an editorial endorsement change during the 
British election. Stevens et al. (2011) focus on newspaper endorsements of Prime Minister Tony 
Blair in the mid-2000s. But these studies often focus single media events at a singular moment in 
time in a particular country.1 Occasionally scholars conduct comparisons of a few countries 
within specific years (Curran et al. 2009; Iyengar et al. 2010), sometimes with a focus on well 
publicized events (e.g., Finseraas and Listhug 2013; Finseraas, Jackobsson, and Kotsadam  
2011), but studies with additional countries spanning multiple years are exceptions rather than 
the rule (cf. Schoonvelde 2013). In this study, we adopt a broad view, calculating and comparing 
media effects across a range of methodological, system, and issue characteristics.  
 
Methodological Factors 
Early on during empirical projects on media effects, and typically at the outset, scholars 
select a research design or designs. A common choice is the comparison of those who report 
being exposed to the media to others who report less or no exposure within a given country (e.g., 
Eveland et al. 2008; Hutchings 2001; Stevens and Karp 2012). Given its popularity, this design is 
the baseline against which we wish to compare other possible choices (we call this the “media 
                                                            
1 Events are used to study the effects of media on public opinion. For instance, Smetko et al. 2003 used the June 
1997 Amsterdam Summit, known as “Eurotop” in the Dutch press, to determine how it altered attitudes toward the 
European Union. They found that attentiveness strongly determined whether or not opinions changed. In contrast, 
Statham and Tumber failed to find linkages between events related to gay rights in Ireland and public support for 
allowing gay men and lesbians “…to live their own life as they wish” (Statham and Tumber 2013, 749-51). 
However, that same study suggests there could be a link between opinion movement on European unification in 
Ireland and negative evaluations detected in media claims, but the analysis was cast as speculative (p. 749).   
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exposure” design or model). Assuming the data are observational—and hence, already 
collected—then a few alternatives to this basic design exist.  
One alternative is to compare treated individuals to their untreated selves in a technique 
known as within-survey/within-subjects (WS/WS) comparisons (see Barabas and Jerit 2009).2 
This technique pushes the logic of counterfactual inference (e.g., Morgan and Winship 2007) to 
its logical end by comparing individuals to themselves rather than engaging in comparisons with 
other survey respondents via “controls.” The idea is to identify questions on the same topic, one 
of which receives media coverage and the other which receives little or no coverage (“the 
baseline”). By looking at the differences in the outcome measure when there is coverage versus 
when there is less or none, researchers can identify media effects that control for all individual-
level characteristics, measured or not.  
 Designs like WS/WS are attractive because media exposure measures are not needed—
i.e., we see differences in outcomes for individuals at any given level of media exposure, 
whatever they choose, no matter how accurately they report it in a survey, etc. However, 
comparable outcome items needed in a WS/WS analysis are often not available in cross-sectional 
surveys. For this reason, researchers might be tempted to explore other design variants, such as 
differences-in-differences (DID) approaches (see Wooldridge 2013, Chapter 13). In DID models, 
researchers have data before and after some key event along with some way (e.g., geography, 
media exposure, etc.) to differentiate those who are exposed to the relevant messages as well as 
those who are not. Even if the two groups start off with baseline differences in the dependent 
variable before the event, assuming they both react similarly, then researchers can take the 
                                                            
2 For earlier within-subjects panel designs on media effects, see Lazarsfeld and Fisk 1938 or Lazarsfeld, Berelson, 
and Gaudet 1944. 
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difference in the changes between the two groups as an estimate of the effect (e.g., Barabas and 
Jerit 2010; Fair, Malhotra, and Shapiro 2012; Keele, Malhotra, and McCubbins 2013).  
 Each design choice has subtle but important ramifications. For example, identifying 
media effects—from a statistical standpoint—depends on having sufficient statistical power to 
reject null hypotheses of no effect. Zaller (2002) demonstrated that detecting significant media 
effects of even 5 or 10 percentage points is often very difficult without thousands of 
observations—far more than most studies or designs often permit. On top of this, if survey 
respondents are harder to reach now than in the past (e.g., Keeter el al. 2006; 2007; National 
Research Council 2013), it could be that more recent studies are smaller or conducted differently 
than in the past. Thus, when the survey is conducted may matter as much as how large it is or 
what designs are used. We will consider all of these factors simultaneously and in relation to 
other possible determinants of media effects discussed next. 
 
Country-level Factors 
Aside from the designs employed, countries vary on many dimensions in ways that might 
accentuate or diminish media effects. For instance, some countries have relatively free and open 
media systems with journalists in control of producing and distributing their own content (e.g., 
Hallin and Mancini 2004). The shear availability of media—in both quantity and quality—might 
mean greater media effects. In other countries, however, government authorities have a greater 
role in the media system. Thus, media system freedom could relate to media effects. Scholars 
have found strong positive effects of media system freedom on political knowledge 
(Schoonvelde 2013), but freer systems may have so many information access points that the 
media could be irrelevant. In other words, new media and alternative sources of information 
(e.g., political discussion) may make the media system characteristics less important than 
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previously thought. Even people who are unexposed to traditional media outlets may learn about 
important news events, perhaps ushering in a new minimal effects era. 
 Countries also vary in their style of government and electoral rules. Some are 
representative democracies while others employ parliamentary systems. Also, some nations 
require everyone to vote—presumably increasing the likelihood that public affairs are covered 
and followed by the populace—while other governments allow people to check out of politics. 
Especially when coupled with high levels of choice regarding what to watch, citizens in “post-
broadcast” democracies (Prior 2007) can tune out politics, which could diminish the impact of 
the mass media.  
 Beyond these factors, countries differ for reasons either relating to—or in spite of—their 
institutional configurations. For example, some are wealthy and others are not. Wealth is often a 
marker of other differences related to education or socio-economic status. Race, gender, and 
immigration all conspire to produce different political dynamics. Still, most of these factors 
would be associated with wealth per capita, making this an important catch-all variable in 
comparisons across countries. In some ways, the number of ways countries could vary is 
limitless; no study could ever hope to control for all relevant differences. Thus, designs like 
those discussed earlier are one way to contend with the possibility of spuriousness or selection in 
non-experimental settings. 
 
Issue Factors 
Aside from methodological or country-level factors, the topics being studied might have 
differential effects. Economic considerations often predominate in elections (e.g., Hetherington 
1996). Scandals are often pivotal too (Miller 2010), but sometimes natural catastrophes are just 
as devastating as man-made ones (Maestas et al. 2008; Gomez and Wilson 2008). Still other 
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distinctions revolve around whether the event in question is an election and whether protest 
movements like the “Occupy Wall Street” campaign exist to galvanize citizens, making people 
extra sensitive (or, paradoxically, perhaps less sensitive) to political communications.3 So, we 
analyze effects across different issue areas, but we do so with the recognition that issue saliency 
could cut in different ways empirically, generating strong effects because many or most people 
consider the topic important (e.g., Krosnick 1990) or weakened effects because people have 
already been exposed and have no further to move (e.g., Druckman and Leeper 2012). 
  
Heterogeneous Media Effects  
Given the scope of our analyses—an attempt to study the effects of hundreds of press-
worthy events across more than a decade in dozens of countries—we are purposely vague 
regarding our expectations. We suspect that certain factors, such as methodological choices will 
be important when it comes to identifying significant media effects. However, there always 
exists the possibility that combining the various factors will obscure our ability to identify effects 
that are real. Likewise, powerful events at one time point may dissipate in another. 
Thus, if anything, we expect heterogeneity. The notion of heterogeneity speaks to broader 
concerns about forms of validity. Increasingly, scholars have focused on internal validity (i.e., 
“causality”), and design choices weigh heavily upon it. However, “…internal validity is not the 
sine qua non of all research” (Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 2002, 98), especially since other 
subtle factors related to the statistical assumptions could mask real effects (i.e., “statistical 
conclusion validity” in the language of Shadish et al.). It could also be that the constructs are not 
                                                            
3 The paradox concerns the twin possibilities of pre-treatment effects (e.g., Druckman and Leeper 2012) in which 
the communication effects are already taking place before the analysis starts or alternative paths to influence that 
exist outside the mass media, such as when individuals communicate with each other (e.g., McClurg 2006; Ryan 
2010). Again, design choices may help contend with these possibilities. 
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properly operationalized or measured (i.e., “construct validity”). At a very general level, though, 
we are perhaps most interested in the issue of generalizability, or “external validity” in the 
parlance of Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 2001; Campbell and Stanley 1963). Often external 
validity is narrowly interpreted in terms of the units being studied (e.g., descriptive 
characteristics of survey respondents). However, the search for generalizable effects is broader 
than that. It goes beyond the units to include types of treatments, contexts in which those 
treatments were delivered, and outcome measures. As such, we adopt a macro view of media 
effects. 
Data and Methods 
We seek to estimate media effects across locations, time, outcomes, and designs. To do 
so, we face uncommon and formidable data acquisition challenges. First, we need data that span 
geographic borders. This rules out commonly used and high quality datasets like the American 
National Election Studies (ANES) or National Annenberg Election Study (NAES). Likewise, we 
would like to be able to study media events over time. Again, temporally isolated multi-country 
studies, such as those conducted by Gallup or Pew, are excluded. Finally, we need surveys that 
are broad with respect to outcomes and media exposure measures; often surveys possess one or 
the other, but not both. 
 One of the few data collections meeting all these requirements is the European Social 
Survey (ESS). This is a cross-national public opinion survey conducted bi-annually since the 
2002. In the first five rounds, which we study, an average of 26 countries appeared in each 
survey round; many of the same countries are surveyed repeatedly (e.g., the United Kingdom, 
Belgium), but occasionally other countries enter and leave the sample (e.g., the Russian 
Federation, Lithuania, Norway). Across the first five rounds, there were nearly 2,000 
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respondents per country and the average response rate was 62 percent across the rounds.4 Most 
surveys are in the field for a few weeks, although some fieldwork periods are longer. Importantly 
for our study, interviewing takes place throughout the year with some temporal overlap.5  
 The ESS surveys are of particular interest because the survey collection teams record 
events that take place in each of the countries that could conceivably affect response patterns. In 
the first five rounds of the ESS, researchers affiliated with the data collection efforts in each of 
the countries documented more than 8,000 events of interest (n=8,142).6 As an example, in the 
second wave of the ESS there was an event reported for October 14, 2004 concerning a 
parliamentary struggle between the Prime Minister of Portugal and the new elected leader of the 
most important opposition party. The event dataset for the ESS elaborates on the feud and 
suggests that this event might be expected to produce less satisfaction toward the way the 
government is acting, which is an outcome variable in the ESS data.7 While this event was likely 
relevant for Spanish respondents, not all of the events were as isolated; many concerned 
developments in other countries or event events in countries outside of the ESS sample (e.g., the 
U.S. presidential election or developments in China). To focus our attention on the events most 
likely to produce an effect, we had two coders unfamiliar with the project characterize all of the 
                                                            
4 The average number of respondents was 1,923 with roughly the same number in each round (round 1 
average=1,925, round 2=1,887, round 3=1,891, round 4=1,968, and round 5=1,943). Likewise, in most rounds the 
ESS approached the target response rate of 70% with averages in the low 60s for each round (61, 62, 63, 62, and 60 
for each of the rounds respectively). 
5 See http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/ for more details on the surveys and methodology.  
6 Most of the events are in round 5 (n=2,153) while the least are in round 1 (n=717). Most events are single day 
events (80%). Not all countries have events recorded, but of those that do, 11% occur within 30 days of the survey 
start and 77% take place within the interview period. 
7 Specifically, the ESS event data characterizes this event as follows: “Santana Lopes had his first parliamentary 
debate on October 14, since nominated in July 2004.  This was simultaneously the first parliamentary confrontation 
between the Prime Minister and the newly elected leader of PS, Socialist Party and the most important opposition 
party.  The Prime Minister has avoided the polemic of the Marcelo crisis and the main subjects of debate were the 
economy, the rents and the SCUT (highway pays). José Sócrates has doubted the legitimacy of Santana Lopes to the 
place of Prime Minister and accused him of not winning national elections (he was substituting José Barroso, the 
previous Prime Minister, which went to European Commission, without any election).  Discussion about the State 
Budget was nearly absent” (emphasis added). 
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events in terms of whether they were domestic or international as well as whether they were 
major or minor.8 Roughly 20 percent of the events were categorized as major (1,663 of 8,142, or 
20.4%) and most were domestic (5,812 or 71.4%). Our inquiry considers nearly 900 events that 
were both major and domestic (n=880). The events covered many different topics, but the main 
ones were economic issues, scandals/resignations, crime, disasters, elections, and strikes.9 
Roughly 100 of these occurred in the thirty days prior to the survey events in each country while 
the remainder took place while the surveys were in the field.10 
 We consider the effects of these ESS events on three variables: trust in politicians, 
economic satisfaction, and satisfaction with the government.11 The other key individual-level 
variables in our inquiry were the media exposure measures. To determine whether a respondent 
was exposed to the media, we created a trichotomous measure of media exposure made up of an 
index of television, radio, newspaper usage.12 As individual-level controls, we employed the 
standard battery of demographic considerations (e.g., education, income, age, race, and 
gender).13 
                                                            
8 In a randomly selected sample of fifty events, the two research assistants achieved relatively high intercoder 
reliability statistics for domestic (Krippendorf alpha=.92) and major vs. minor distinctions (Krippendorf alpha=.60).  
9 We created dummy variables for each of these relative to the omitted baseline of non-economic national events. 
10 The appendix contains details on the countries and events by ESS round as well as other coding decisions. 
11 The trust in politicians question was, “Using this card, please tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally 
trust each of the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means you have 
complete trust. Firstly...trust in politicians.” The economic satisfaction question was an 11 point scale (from 
0=extremely dissatisfied, 1=extremely satisfied) of “On the whole how satisfied are you with the present state of the 
economy in [country]?”  Finally, the government satisfaction item used the same 11 point scale in response to “Now 
thinking about the [country] government, how satisfied are you with the way it is doing its job? These variables have 
the ESS neumonics of TRSTPLT, STFECO, and STFGOV. 
12 The media index was an additive scale built from the responses to 8-point measures of "on an average weekday, 
how much of your time watching television is spent watching news or programmes about politics and current 
affairs?" for television and similar items for radio, and newspapers. The answer choices were time-based increments 
ranging from “no time at all” to “more than three hours.” 
13 The education item was a seven point measure from less than lower/secondary to higher tertiary education above 
an MA degree. Race was a binary indicator of whether the respondent belonged to “a minority ethnic group” in the 
country. Income was a twelve point measure of household net total income from less than €1800 to €120000 or 
more. All independent and dependent variables were rescaled to the 0 to 1 interval. 
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 Beyond the individual-level, we create measures for media system freedom based upon 
Freedom House scores (see Schoonvelde 2013 for similar measures).14 Variables representing a 
country’s political system (1=parliamentary system; 0=otherwise), compulsory voting, and gross 
national income also were included. The country-specific factors one might include are potential 
limitless; we limited our attention to factors that have established effects in previous work on this 
topic. As a precaution, we report analyses with fixed-effects terms for countries in a series of 
robustness checks. 
In the empirical analyses that follow, we estimate as many models as we can for the three 
dependent variables subject to data constraints dictated by three designs. For the baseline design, 
we study events occurring 30 days or less from the start of the survey period and we focus on the 
media exposure coefficient. That estimate is then compared with the two rival designs discussed 
earlier: (1) a within-survey/within-subjects (WS/WS) design and (2) a difference-in-differences 
(DID) design. For the WS/WS comparison, the design imposed an extra restriction of having a 
similar dependent variable which was not influenced by media exposure but one that could 
plausibly tap baseline levels of trust. For this we employed trust in the UN (i.e., each trust in 
politicians variable was differenced by levels of trust in the UN at the individual-level). For the 
DID analysis, we needed observations before and after the key media event. That meant studying 
                                                            
14 The media freedom measure is a continuous measure that rates countries based on government interference in 
their media sectors. In its original form, it is scaled from 0 (most free) to 100 (least free) and is constructed from 23 
items that are subdivided into three equally weighted subcategories: legal environment, political environment and 
economic environment. See Schoonvelde (2013) for a detailed description of the subcategories, but broadly they 
cover laws and the legal regulatory environment (legal), political control over media content (political), and 
ownership structures (economic). The variable was inverted and rescaled to the 0 to 1 interval so that higher values 
convey more freedom.  
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a different set of events than the first two designs (exposure by country and WS/WS within a 
country). 15  
 Unlike other media effects studies, our quantities of interest are the regression output 
from hundreds of statistical models. Specifically we examine the absolute value of the t-values 
for models in each of the designs with the goal of uncovering which designs produce the “most 
significant” results. Of course, another quantity of interest is the subset of cases that exceed the  
1.96 significance threshold for p < .05 (two-tailed) findings. So, in auxiliary analyses we also 
consider that specification. However, both of the preceding analyses have to do with statistical 
significance. To examine substantive significance, we attempt to look at the size of the 
coefficients (i.e., effect sizes) in yet another auxiliary analysis. These analyses proceed as two-
step multilevel models (e.g., Jusko and Shively 2005), in which the data is the output from 
hundreds of models estimating media effects. To adjust for the repeated observations by event 
(i.e., some events are present in all three designs, producing three entries for each model), we 
cluster the standard errors and apply White’s correction to offset any potential heteroskedasticity 
(Lewis and Linzer 2005).  
 
Empirical Results 
Table 1 provides some basic descriptive information on the events we studied. In 
particular, the table contains all designs aggregated as well as each of the separate designs. We 
have 839 observations for the trust in politicians outcome, and the mean t-value (in absolute 
terms) was 1.829 with a standard deviation of 2.120. The range was essentially zero (.006) to 
more than 24 (24.247), which is an extremely large t-value. The other outcome variables have 
                                                            
15 We make use of 741 unique events for which models could be estimated due to data requirements (i.e., occurring 
at right moment relative to the survey interview period). Some of these events are repeated in the dataset when 
analyzed by different designs. 
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slightly higher means (1.990 for economic satisfaction and 2.262 for government satisfaction), 
both of which are—on average—significant findings in the sense that they would be above the 
1.96 threshold for findings at the 95% confidence level using both tails of the distribution. The 
average number of observations was around 10,000 for all three outcomes with a range of fewer 
than twenty to more than 20,000.  
 The aggregate patterns for all of the designs together mask a considerable amount of 
variance. Specifically, for the nearly 100 events we studied using the media exposure design 
(n=98), the average t-values were much smaller for all three outcomes (i.e., never larger than 
1.133 on average and never more than a value of three). The average number of observations was 
also more modest at 568 with a range of 17 to 1,889. The WS/WS design had the same sample 
size average and range for the one outcome we could study (due to the lack of a counterfactual 
outcome on the satisfaction measures). Likewise, the average t-value was under a value of 1 and 
never rose beyond 2.3. The last part of Table 1 foreshadows patterns that will be seen in the 
regression analyses discussed next. For the 643 events we could study using the DID approach, 
the average t-value was comfortably above p < .05 levels since they were above two for all three 
outcomes and the sample sizes were near 12,000 on average. Thus, the descriptive statistics tell 
an important story about variation across the designs with a decisive edge going to the DID 
design. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 Perhaps it is not surprising, then, when we examine the regression output in Table 2 that 
the coefficients for the designs are statistically significant and signed in directions that mirror 
what we saw in the descriptives. For the first dependent variable of trust in politicians, the entries 
in the first column show that the WS/WS design has smaller absolute t-values than the media 
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exposure design (omitted category) baseline by roughly a quarter point (-.245 with a standard 
error of .074, p < .01 two-tailed). In contrast, the t-values in the DID design were two and a half 
points larger than the media exposure designs net of the other factors we considered 
(coeff.=2.529, p < .01). This is a pattern that was accentuated for the other two outcome 
variables. T-values in the DID design were bigger, by 4.218 for economic satisfaction and 5.439 
for government satisfaction (p < .01 for both). Thus, the DID design is much more likely to 
detect significant media effects than the typical media exposure design. 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 While it is the case that the DID designs offered more observations per event studied (and 
presumably more statistical power), the next methodological factor we considered shows that 
having numerous cases does not necessarily mean more significant results. In particular, the log 
of the number of observations available is significantly (p < .01) associated with smaller t-values 
for all three outcome variables.16 This means that the DID design has an advantage that is not 
simply due to the edge in statistical power; if anything, having more cases tended to produce 
fewer statistically significant results with this design. This finding is counterintuitive and at odds 
with the conventional wisdom concerning the need for statistical power in media effects studies 
(e.g., Zaller 2002).17  
 The last methodological factor we consider relates to the temporal dimension of our 
study. In particular, the t-values were smaller in more recent ESS rounds for two of the three 
                                                            
16 We used the log of the number of observations instead of the count to produce more meaningful results, but we 
obtain the same finding with the unlogged counts for all three outcome variables; the coefficients are negatively 
signed and significant at p < .01, two-tailed. 
17 Interactions with the design dummy variables and the number of observations (logged) reveal negative and 
significant coefficients for the DID design interacted with the number of observations (p < .01 for trust in politicians 
and p < .10 for the satisfaction outcomes). For trust in politicians model where we are able to contrast the WS/WS 
technique, that interaction term between the WS/WS design and the number of observations is also negative and 
significant (p <.05); the term is positive and significant (p < .05), suggesting that additional observations in the 
omitted exposure design baseline are associated with higher t-values.   
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outcome variables (trust in politicians and economic satisfaction), but the significance levels 
were weaker (p < .10). In other analyses (not shown), we employed dummy variables for each 
ESS round instead of the additive term that is shown in Table 2. In those regressions, the latest 
rounds are much less likely to produce large t-values as compared with the initial ESS surveys in 
the early-2000s for the satisfaction outcomes.18 We hesitate to speculate on the cause of this null 
effect, but it is a potentially unsettling development for media effects researchers and one that 
provides suggestive evidence—though far from conclusive—in support for arguments 
concerning a new era of minimal media effects. 
 Our next class of variables shown in Table 2 relates to country-level factors. In particular, 
we studied institutional variables as well as relative wealth. The only factor that seems to matter 
consistently is media freedom. For all three outcome measures, the coefficient on media freedom 
is negative and statistically significant (p < .01). In contrast, the other country-level factors are 
almost never statistically significant; only the parliamentary dummy in the trust model 
approaches conventional significance levels (p < .10). From this it seems that informal 
institutions, such as the level of freedom in a country’s media system structure, tend to make it 
harder to find statistically significant effects for all three outcomes we studied.19 As for why 
media freedom tends to undercut the statistical significance of media effects, we suspect it may 
be related to complimentary trends that tend to co-occur in open societies such as free 
information exchange beyond the mass media. In other words, if information flows freely, 
                                                            
18 For economic satisfaction, a round 5 ESS dummy variable has a coefficient of -.976 with a standard error of .47, p 
< .05 (the baseline is round 1). For government satisfaction, the coefficient is = -1.105 with a standard error of .658, 
p < .10. The dummies for rounds 2-4 are also negatively signed, but most are p >.05.  
19 Once again, there is some evidence that the effect is specific to the DID design based upon interactions with the 
design and media freedom (all three interaction term coefficients are negative, but the p-values range from .08 to 
.16. 
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country-wide events may influence everyone more readily, irrespective of whether they report 
high media exposure or not. 
 While the media freedom finding is provocative, we hesitate to read too much into these 
preliminary analyses without additional research. In particular, our models may have omitted 
other important country-level factors. One way of diagnosing potential omitted variable 
problems is to include fixed effect dummy variables for each country that can, in essence, stand 
in for country level factors that have been omitted from the models. When we do this, the 
coefficients remain negatively signed, but the standard errors rise considerably to the point where 
the media freedom findings become statistically insignificant for all three outcomes. In contrast, 
the findings concerning methodological factors (i.e., design dummies and observation counts) 
remain even when we include the country fixed effects. All of this suggests that researchers 
studying variations in media systems might want to be even more cautious when conducting 
cross-national comparisons. Attempts to find countries that are otherwise similar may be 
worthwhile, and researchers have been exploring ways to identify states or regions that can serve 
as counterfactuals based upon matching (e.g., Abadie, Diamond, and Hainmueller 2010). 
 The final set of factors we consider in Table 2 are related to issues. Of the dummy 
variables that capture differences in the substantive content of the events, two prove to be 
statistically significant in many of the models. Events related to crime tend to have smaller t-
values (although less so on government satisfaction) and the same holds for stories about 
disasters (mainly for political trust and government satisfaction, both p < .01). Here the omitted 
baseline comparison group is non-economic national events and stories. Our interpretation of the 
issue findings relies on the same logic we introduced earlier. For sensational crime/scandal 
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stories or those relating to national disasters, information is disseminated widely. Searching for 
an exposed subset of the population, when most people are exposed, becomes harder. 
 The findings thus far make use of the absolute t-values. To guard against any biases that 
may be related to conceptualizing the dependent variable this way, we also estimated our models 
with two other versions of the outcome measures. The first alternative dependent variable 
dichotomizes the t-values measure so that values of 1.96 or greater are scored as 1 and all others 
take zero. This type of measure considers when we have “significant” media effects using the p < 
.05 threshold for significance at the 95% level for two-tails. Roughly one-third of our models 
turned up significant effects for each of the three dependent variables.20 These models (see the 
appendix for tables of output) largely confirm that patterns reported earlier. Design choices, the 
number of observations, media freedom, and issues all matter in the same ways when it comes to 
discovering significant effects or not. For example, the WS/WS design makes it 14 percent less 
likely to observe significant findings for trust in politicians than the media exposure baseline 
(marginal effect=.137, se=.049, p < .05) while the DID design elevates the likelihood by 28 
percent (marginal effect=..279, p < .01). The DID design detects significant effects even more 
powerfully for the other outcome variables (35 and 41 percent improvements, both p < .01, for 
economic and government satisfaction respectively). 
 But statistical significance (i.e., t-value) or finding statistically significant results 
(dichotomizing t > 1.96) does not necessarily mean the results would be substantively significant. 
To consider the relative magnitude of the effects, we changed the dependent variable to the 
media effects coefficient. In those models (reported in the appendix), the DID design generates 
                                                            
20 For trust in politicians, 33.7% of the models produced media effects of 1.96 or greater (mean=.337, sd=.473). For 
economic satisfaction, the mean was similar (mean=.331, sd=.471) and for government satisfaction, there were a 
few more significant effects (mean=.364, sd=.481). 
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larger coefficients holding other factors constant. Other factors, like the log of the number of 
observations and media system factors are negatively related to the (absolute) size of the 
coefficient (always p < .01 for all three outcome measures).21 The issue related factors are 
intermittently significant, with disasters producing slightly smaller coefficients on average. Thus, 
considering statistical as well as substantive significance, the same patterns appear. Design 
choices powerfully shape both the statistical and substantive effects across hundreds of events 
and dozens of countries in surveys spanning a decade.  
 
Discussion 
Our analyses were unconventional. Instead of focusing on isolated events, issues, or 
methodologies, we cast a wide net. The consistency of findings—across outcome measures and 
measurement choices—was reassuring. But consistency does not necessarily mean consistently 
significant. In fact, nearly two-thirds of the models we estimated produced statistically 
insignificant coefficients. In the course of research, analysts sometimes cycle through many 
different specifications in a search for publishable findings. These specification searches 
(Leamer 1978) appear to be related to professional pressures related to editorial standards, 
leading to publication bias in favor of significant results (see Gerber, Green, and Nickerson 2000 
or Gerber and Malhotra 2008 on the “file-drawer problem” in political science). This study 
avoids that problem by reporting everything; we reveal the contents of the entire filing cabinet, 
or at least several drawers of it when it comes to media effects research.   
 While the breadth of our study may have virtues, it comes with downsides as well. One 
drawback relates to notion that some of our findings, even if statistically significant, may be due 
                                                            
21 In addition to the same set of variables we considered earlier, we include the standard error of the coefficient as a 
precaution on the idea that a big coefficient might not be meaningful except in relation to the size of the standard 
error. 
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to chance variation. That is, even at the p <.05 significance level, we would expect one in twenty 
coefficients to be significant. Given that we estimated nearly 2,300 coefficients for all three 
dependent variables for just the original dependent variable specifications (N’s of 839, 741, and 
741 for each model in Table 2, which sum to 2,321), this means that there are probably more 
than 100 spurious findings in the set of significant findings (Type I errors). Of course, there are 
probably an offsetting number of insignificant findings which are truly significant (i.e., Type II 
errors). One way to correct for this problem, Bonferroni-type adjustments, could lead to more 
conservative conclusions. 
 A second weakness of the present study pertains to factors that could not be included due 
to data availability. For example, it is natural to wonder what the results would look like with 
alternative measure of media exposure; self-reported exposure measures were used in some of 
the designs and they have been critiqued by some scholars (e.g., Prior 2009). Another line of 
inquiry might include a measure representing the proximity of the event to the survey. On 
average, our events were roughly eleven days prior to the start of the survey (average = 10.7). 
This information is available for two of our designs (media exposure and WS/WS), but the way 
we calculated the DIDs meant that there was always a thirty day window before and after the 
event so the timing could not be considered explicitly. Yet another limitation pertains to 
variation in the expected relationship between the event and the dependent variable (e.g., some 
events might be expected to produce a negative finding while others are expected to be positive 
related to the outcome measure). All three versions of the models reported earlier ignore the 
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direction of the finding, but one could imagine altering our variables so as to capture this 
information.22  
Finally, there have been efforts to expand the ESS, and the data source itself was 
designated as an exceptionally valuable European research asset in 2013.23 There is little doubt 
about the utility of the surveys for a great number of outcomes, but a different set of priorities 
might emerge from the perspective of someone searching for media effects based upon the 
events data. In particular, there was a great deal of heterogeneity in how the studies are 
conducted in each country. Earlier we reported the high degree of variation in the survey 
response rates across the countries, but there was also variation in when the surveys took place, 
how they were conducted, and the question that were asked, among other things. More research 
is needed on the ESS events file itself to make those data more useful (also see the appendix). 
We only used a faction of the entire events file (i.e., ten percent of the events that were both 
major and domestic), and there might be other subtle patterns in terms of the country-based 
reporting which could alter the effects. For instance, some countries contributed greatly to the 
events report—the top countries with more than five percent of the events were Spain, Portugal, 
Belgium, Germany, Hungary, and Israel. Other countries registered far fewer events. Bulgaria, 
Italy, Iceland, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Russia, Ireland, and Slovakia contributed fewer than two 
percent of the cases. Thus, while geographically broad, there might be patterns in terms of the 
                                                            
22 We were able to include a term on the right-hand side which captured whether the coefficient was negative or 
positive. Those “negative coefficient” terms are themselves negative and significant (p < .05), and their inclusion did 
not change the patterns reported earlier.  
23In November of 2013, the ESS was awarded ERIC (European Research Infrastructure Consortium) status. 
According to the news release (http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/about/news.html), “ERICs are facilities for the 
scientific community, allowing researchers access to archives and tools to conduct top-level research. Member 
States, Associated and Third Countries and intergovernmental organisations may become members of  
an ERIC.” 
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distribution and quality of the events file and survey data which could be influencing our 
results.24  
 
Conclusion 
Our macroscopic study of media effects suggests that design choices weigh heavily on 
the findings. Against the backdrop of the traditional media exposure model, some research 
designs accentuate (DID) or diminish effects (WS/WS) across a range of outcomes and settings. 
A subtle factor related to design choices—the statistical power of the model—seems to have 
counterintuitive effects. While the number of cases is important in traditional media exposure 
model design as Zaller (2002) showed and our results confirm, different designs that elevate the 
importance of counterfactuals demonstrate that the number of cases is less important and may 
even result in fewer statistically significant findings. Thus, as Shadish, Cook, and Campbell 
remind us, research design choices often trump statistical considerations (2002, 105).  
Another finding which cuts against the conventional wisdom concerns the role of 
institutional factors. Formal institutions were almost never significant (i.e., parliamentary system 
or compulsory voting) whereas informal institutions related to media freedom did matter—but 
the direction of the influence was negative. That is, significant media effects were less likely to 
be observed in countries with “freer” media systems. We urge readers to view this result with 
caution since it was not robust to alternative specifications; there appear to be other country-level 
factors that make the negative media freedom effect diminish. However, even showing no effects 
for media institutions should be of interest given the state of the literature (Fraile 2013; Hallin 
                                                            
24 Other questions concerning the events arise too, such as the relationship of events to actual coverage. Others who 
study events (e.g., Smetko et al. 2003; Ladd and Lenz 2009; Stevens et al. 2011) show that they do generate 
coverage. 
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and Macini 2004; Iyengar et al. 2010; Schoonvelde 2013). The isolated instances of system 
significance may be outliers in the larger population of possible media effect studies.  
Nevertheless, media effects can be identified on a large-scale across many different 
outcomes and methodological choices. Whether or not our own findings on the generalizability 
of media effects are generalizable is unknown. But, with more studies of studies, we will be able 
to make assertions that span designs, time, space, outcomes, and contexts. Seeing the entire 
forest rather than individual trees reveals quite a bit even if some details are lost in the process. 
 
Appendix 
This appendix provides a description of the events data as well as details on data 
processing and coding that was necessary to undertake prior to our analysis. Replication data and 
code will be available on the authors’ website after publication. 
Description of ESS Events Data 
 The European Social Survey (ESS) is a cross-national study that has been conducted 
every two years since 2001 in various countries across Europe. In conjunction with the 
individual-level data sets for each round, the ESS team has also released data designed to capture 
the political context within the participating countries. The political structure of Europe is such 
that there are likely to be shared environmental factors affecting sets of countries, as well as 
domestic factors specific to individual nations. The ESS event file offers an expansive, publicly-
available data source for researchers looking to integrate these factors into their analyses. 
 Each event report typically provides several pieces of information, including a 
substantive description (e.g. “UK house prices have fallen for an 11th consecutive month”) and 
categorization ("[e]vents concerning the national economy, labour market”) of the event, start 
and end dates, and potentially connected items from the survey instrument. Responsibility for 
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collecting these data appears to be decentralized, falling to separate research teams in each 
country involved in the broader study. Each group follows a set of common instructions on how 
to collect and record media-reported events.  This delegation of collection duty to the numerous 
local teams has advantages with respect to accurately capturing events occurring in many locales 
at once. On the other hand, one drawback likely attributable to this arrangement is heterogeneity 
in what gets reported by each team.  For instance, some events are sourced, while others are not. 
There are also practical differences in formatting and structure between subsets of the countries. 
 For those who may wish to construct new variables or employ the events data in a 
modeling capacity, standardization is an obvious imperative. We transformed the data set in 
several ways to improve its usefulness in our analyses. Many of the issues we outline below are 
likely to be encountered by all users upon first opening the unprocessed events file. Our 
corrections are often generally applicable. The corrected events data set and the underlying code 
are available in the replication materials for this paper. 
 Appendix Table 1 summarizes the cumulative events data file for all countries 
participating in any of the first five ESS studies. This table shows which survey rounds each 
country participated in, as well as counts of events in the data set. We first show the total number 
of events reported by a country, and then subdivide this number into events reported in the thirty 
days prior to the start of one of a given country’s survey rounds, and number of events reported 
during one of a given country’s survey rounds.  The table also displays separate counts for one 
subcategory of events we deemed particularly useful (“Domestic/Major”; we discuss this 
distinction later). Ignoring for a moment these final three columns, several features of the data 
are worth noting. First, the pattern of inclusion in the five rounds varies considerably across the 
set of countries. Less than half of the participating nations were present for all rounds (i.e. 
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Denmark, UK). Others are included for only a single year (Austria), while the rest participate in 
some continuous (Ukraine) or non-continuous (Netherlands) subset of rounds.  
INSERT APPENDIX TABLE 1 HERE 
 Similarly, there is a large degree of variance in the overall number of stories reported in 
each country. This may be due in some part to substantive differences in political context 
between the participant nations, but there are also systematic differences in reporting frequencies 
that seem difficult to justify on substantive grounds. For example, Spain and the United 
Kingdom are both large countries that participated in all five waves. However, the former 
reported nearly three times as many events (1,441) as the latter (484). Such extreme discrepancy 
likely reflects differences between the reporting patterns of the separate ESS teams rather than 
real variance in the political environment within the associated countries. Caution is advised in 
using these data for any application that might require comparable between-country counts of 
events. 
 Figures A1a and A1b graphically illustrate a few of the ways in which event reporting 
differed between countries, again using Spain and the United Kingdom as examples. The two 
countries first vary in terms of the time frame and length of survey interview periods, as depicted 
by the horizontal lines within the chart space. Likewise, there are also substantial differences in 
the timing of event reports, denoted by the rug plot (i.e., the black vertical lines) positioned 
above the X-axis. Spain reported more events than the United Kingdom overall (see Appendix 
Table 1), and reporting closely coincides with the timing of the five ESS rounds. On the other 
hand, the United Kingdom team reported many events in the intervening period between rounds. 
 The data set includes media-reported events occurring both internationally and 
domestically. An election in the United States, for instance, might be reported if it receives 
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significant coverage. While international events could be utilized in other settings, the most 
useful reports for our analyses were those reflecting unique qualities of the political environment 
within a single country. To identify this category of events, coders read through every entry in 
the cumulative file, and judged whether each operated at the international (i.e. an election in the 
USA reported by the UK team) or domestic level (an election in the UK reported by the UK 
team).  
Finally, events within the file vary considerably in terms of their magnitude of 
importance. Perceptions of importance are, of course, subjective to a degree, but some events 
clearly stood out to us as more likely to have perceptible effects on ESS survey responses than 
others. Our coders also made entries denoting which events appeared to be “major” compared to 
the others reported. To illustrate, we judged an attempted car bombing at Glasgow airport to be 
major, while a report about an isolated factory closing was judged to be minor. The cross-section 
of events that were both domestic and major was of greatest interest. As shown in the rightmost 
columns of Appendix Table 1, these events comprise a small subset of the overall reporting. 
In addition to our new coding, we also corrected numerous existing issues within the 
data: 
Creating Consistent Date Formats  
Maintaining a uniform date format for each record is necessary to effectively use the 
events file with statistical software. Unfortunately, the date entries in the unprocessed file 
fluctuate between four different primary formats: mm/dd/yyyy for single dates, and either dd-
dd/mm/yyyy, dd/mm/yyyy-dd/mm/yyyy, or dd/mm-dd/mm/yyyy in cases where an event 
spanned multiple days. There are also dozens of entries with idiosyncratic formatting that does 
not match any of these patterns. Dates with non-standard formatting were coerced to one of the 
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four main styles. In order to form a uniform date indicator, we first ran a program to 
automatically identify the format of each date entry. This information is used to parse 
information on the day, month, and year of each event. We use this information to construct 
separate variables for the start and end date of each event. For single-day events, both of these 
variables take the same value. We store these dates in a single, common format (mm/dd/yyyy) 
easily read by modern software. 
Identification of the Survey Field Period 
Another problem related to dates involved the published beginning and end of the ESS 
survey periods for each country. Documentation on the ESS website provides a set of “fieldwork 
period” dates corresponding to each country for each round. However, these dates often fail to 
match the earliest and/or latest interview dates recorded in the individual-level survey data. 
Having an accurate sense of when events occurred relative to the beginning of each survey was 
important for many of our analyses. Thus, we constructed our own survey start and end variables 
from the dates of the actual interviews in the survey data.  
Removal of Duplicate Events  
We deleted a total of 207 duplicate entries in the events file. Many of these entries were a 
result of multiple reporting of a single, ongoing event. This type of duplicate appeared in an 
inconsistent pattern throughout the data, so we settled on the convention of keeping only a single 
event report in these cases. Some others duplicates had no immediately obvious reason for being 
repeated, and were also removed. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Information
Overall (All  Designs) -- --
Trust Politicians |t-value|
Econ. Satisifaction |t-value|
Gov't Satisfaction |t-value|
Cases for Trust Politicians
Cases for Econ. Satisfaction
Cases for Gov't Satisfaction
Media Exposure Design
Trust Politicians |t-value|
Econ. Satisifaction |t-value|
Gov't Satisfaction |t-value|
Cases for Trust Politicians
Cases for Econ. Satisfaction
Cases for Gov't Satisfaction
Within-Survey/Within-Subjects Design
Trust Politicians |t-value|
Econ. Satisifaction |t-value|
Gov't Satisfaction |t-value|
Cases for Trust Politicians
Cases for Econ. Satisfaction
Cases for Gov't Satisfaction
Difference-in-Differences Design
Trust Politicians |t-value|
Econ. Satisifaction |t-value|
Gov't Satisfaction |t-value|
Cases for Trust Politicians
Cases for Econ. Satisfaction
Cases for Gov't Satisfaction
0.888 .006 2.296
N/A N/A
N/A N/A N/A
0.638
0.827 .018 2.618
568 17 1889
0.649
453
9278
10399
10191
839
741
741
839
741
2.262
Mean Minimum Maximum
Standard
Dev.
1.829
1.990
98
N/A N/A
98
N/A
Number
of Obs.
98
741
2.120
3.089
3.394
6681
6223
6103
.006
.005
.006
17
17
17
24.287
38.943
40.455
20739
20662
20230
643 11657 5159 229 20230
98 568 453 17 1889
643 11932 5289 235 20739
643 11897 5254 232 20662
643 2.481 3.585 .006 40.455
.007 24.287
643 2.167 3.270 .005 38.943
N/A N/A N/A
643 2.078 2.335
98 568 453 17 1889
N/A N/A N/A N/A
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
98 568 453 17 1889
98 1.133 0.737 .046 2.821
98 0.830 0.654 .065 2.494
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Table 2. Generalized Media Effects: Predicting Model |T-Values|
Methdological Factors a
Design: Within-Survey/Subjects (WS/WS) -.245 *** -- --
Design: Difference-in-Differences (DID) 2.529 *** 4.218 *** 5.439 ***
Number of Observations (Logged) -.470 *** -.860 *** -1.158 ***
ESS Survey Rounds 1-5 -.137 * -.184 * -.186
Country Factors
Media System Freedom -2.234 *** -2.095 *** -2.218 ***
Parliamentary System -.339 * -.021 -.117
Compulsory Voting -.010 -.148 -.256
Gross National Income per Capita/1000 .010 .009 .028
Issue Factors
Economic -.440 * .177 -.410
Scandal -.273 -.224 -.246
Crime -.660 * -.802 *** -.460
Disaster -1.109 *** -.360 -1.429 ***
Election -.254 .202 -.063
Strike -.102 .905 .114
Constant 6.552 *** 8.100 *** 9.827 ***
R-squared
F-test
Number of cases (i.e., models estimated)
Number of countries
(1.340) (2.214) (2.730)
(.703)
(.254)
(.393)
(.304)
(.310)
(.228)
(.766)
DV: DV:
(.522)
Trust Pol.
(.374)
28
(.232)
28
(.455)
(.653)
    5.95***          8.20***     5.79***
(.074)
(.446)
(.010)
(.184)
(.141)
(.073)
741
.09
Gov't Satis.
(.314)
(.451)
(.331)
(.380)
(.555)
(.456)
(1.329)
(.017)
(.139)
(.292)
Econ. Satis.
(.088)
(.848)
(.523)
28
(.427)
(.644)
(.342)
(.279)
(.009)
DV:
(.313)
(1.124)
839 741
.10 .07
(.339)
(.254)
Note: Coefficients are ordinary least squares estimates with dependent variables of Trust in Politicians (Trust 
Pol.), economic satisfaction (Econ. Satis.), and government statisfaction (Gov.'t Sat). Robust standard errors, 
clustered by the event (in cases of repeated events), are in the parentheses. 
*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10 (two-tailed)
a Effects vs. omitted baseline design of within a single country, exposed compared to unexposed.
36 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Appendix Table 1. Summary of European Social Survey (ESS) Events
Country Rounds All Prior During All Prior During
Austria 1 18 0 0 4 0 0
Belgium 1-5 1031 93 834 103 5 89
Bulgaria 3-4 20 2 9 5 0 2
Cyprus 3-4 91 1 86 8 0 8
Czech Republic 1-2, 4-5 150 60 67 33 17 13
Denmark 1-5 210 13 196 24 2 22
Estonia 2-5 83 17 45 15 3 7
Finland 1-4 113 19 83 12 2 9
France 3-4 91 3 86 7 0 7
Germany 1-5 468 25 360 56 0 43
Greece 1-2, 4 86 6 47 19 0 13
Hungary 1-5 274 72 181 41 12 26
Iceland 2 14 6 8 2 0 2
Ireland 1-5 247 0 226 25 0 18
Israel 1, 4-5 236 8 212 42 2 38
Italy 1 16 4 0 3 1 0
Luxembourg 2 260 38 209 10 0 10
Netherlands 1, 3-4 241 15 176 39 4 26
Norway 1-5 117 28 84 13 2 11
Poland 1-5 220 24 145 34 4 18
Portugal 1-5 1089 240 742 97 18 72
Romania 4 27 0 0 10 0 0
Russia 3-4 96 23 71 10 2 8
Slovakia 2-5 138 4 133 14 0 14
Slovenia 1-4 119 18 84 25 5 17
Spain 1-5 1441 110 1294 126 11 112
Sweden 1-4 76 17 55 11 6 5
Switzerland 1-5 498 22 417 36 2 31
Turkey 2 120 0 120 8 0 8
Ukraine 2-4 68 30 37 9 4 5
United Kingdom 1-5 484 19 296 39 0 28
Full Data Set Domestic/Major
Note: The overall count of events (All) is disaggregated into events occurring within a 30-day 
window  prior to the start of a country's ESS survey period (Prior) and events occurring during 
the survey period (During). "Domestic/Major" is a subset of events scored as both domestic and 
major by our coders (see text for details). 
Round 1 = 2002, 2 = 2004, 3 = 2006, 4 = 2008, 5 = 2010.
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Appendix Table 2. Generalized Media Effects: Predicting Significant Effects (t>|1.96|)
Methdological Factors a
Design: Within-Survey/Subjects (WS/WS) -.422 *** -- --
Design: Difference-in-Differences (DID) .915 *** 1.495 *** 1.761 ***
Number of Observations (Logged) -.088 -.148 * -.125 *
ESS Survey Rounds 1-5 -.105 *** -.156 *** -.065
Country Factors
Media System Freedom -1.365 *** -1.935 *** -.065
Parliamentary System -.262 *** .046 .027
Compulsory Voting .124 .164 -.094
Gross National Income per Capita/1000 .003 -.001 -.006
Issue Factors
Economic -.077 .086 .011
Scandal -.272 * .022 -.022
Crime -.399 -.728 *** .130
Disaster -.370 -.169 -.210
Election -.313 * -.053 .129
Strike .005 .562 -.084
Constant 1.418 * 1.697 *** -.396
Pseudo R-squared
Wald
Number of cases 
Number of countries
741
48.32***
(.663) (.689) (.633)
28 28 28
.07 .08 .07
57.24***57.21***
839 741
(.182) (.189) (.185)
(.324) (.362) (.386)
(.279) (.299) (.277)
(.280) (.282) (.306)
(.151) (.155) (.155)
(.150) (.162) (.160)
(.164) (.167) (.164)
(.007) (.007) (.007)
(.482) (.493) (.450)
(.110) (.117) (.113)
(.069) (.073) (.072)
(.040) (.045) (.043)
(.170)
(.288) (.324) (.361)
DV: DV: DV:
Trust Pol. Econ. Satis. Gov't Satis.
Note: Coefficients are probit estimates with dependent variables of Trust in Politicians (Trust Pol.), economic 
satisfaction (Econ. Satis.), and government statisfaction (Gov.'t Sat). Robust standard errors, clustered by the event 
(in cases of repeated events), are in the parentheses. 
*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10 (two-tailed)
a Effects vs. omitted baseline design of within a single country, exposed compared to unexposed.
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Appendix Table 3. Generalized Media Effects: Predicting (Absolute Value) Coefficient Size
Methdological Factors 
Design: Within-Survey/Within-Subjects (WS/WS)a .001 -- --
Design: Difference-in-Differences (DID)a .051 *** .103 *** .094 ***
Number of Observations (Logged) -.009 *** -.019 *** -.019 ***
ESS Survey Rounds 1-5 -.001 -.003 -.001
Country Factors
Media System Freedom -.033 *** -.040 *** -.043 ***
Parliamentary System -.002 .010 * .010 *
Compulsory Voting -.001 -.008 -.009 *
Gross National Income per Capita/1000 .000 .000 .000
Issue Factors
Economic -.004 .003 -.006
Scandal -.006 -.004 -.011 *
Crime -.003 .005 .012
Disaster -.020 *** -.003 -.019 *
Election -.006 -.002 -.005
Strike -.003 .023 * .001
SE of Coefficient .567 *** .342 .573 *
Constant .100 *** .160 *** .160 ***
R-squared
F-test
Number of cases 
Number of countries
    13.82***       12.27***
(.026) (.038) (.037)
28 28 28
.16 .14 .16
839 741 741
      9.96***
(.132) (.222) (.251)
(.005) (.007) (.007)
(.008) (.013) (.011)
(.013) (.022) (.024)
(.006) (.011) (.010)
(.004) (.007) (.006)
(.005) (.007) (.006)
(.004) (.005) (.005)
(.000) (.000) (.000)
(.010) (.013) (.016)
(.003) (.005) (.004)
(.003) (.005) (.004)
(.001) (.002) (.002)
(.002)
(.010) (.016) (.016)
Trust Economic Government
Politicians Satisfaction Satisfaction
Note: Coefficients are ordinary least squares estimates. Robust standard errors, clustered by the event (in cases of repeated 
events), are in the parentheses. *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10 (two-tailed)
a Effects vs. omitted baseline design of within a single country, exposed compared to unexposed.
